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The Argentine Dilemma: “Vulture Funds” and the Risks Posed to Developing
Economies
Abstract
Post-crisis Argentina is a case study of crisis management through debt restructuring. This article
examines how Argentina negotiated the external debt in the wake of the sovereign default in December
2001 and now confronts challenges posed by holdout creditors—the so called “vulture funds”. It argues
that debt restructuring has put a straitjacket on the national economy, making it virtually impossible for
healthy growth short of a break with the international economic order. While Argentina has successfully
restructured a $95 billion debt with an unprecedented “hair cut” (around 70% reduction in “net value of
debt”), a sustainable growth appears out of reach as long as reliance on the government debt market
prevails. In this cycle, the transmission belt of financial crisis to developing countries is characterized by
the entry of highly speculative players such as hedge funds, conflicts of interests embedded in “sovereign
debt restructuring” (SDR) and vulnerabilities associated with “emerging market debt”.
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Background: Argentine Debt Restructuring 2005-Present
Facing a major recession tied to the global economic crisis of 1999, Argentina defaulted
on nearly $95 billion in debt on December 2001. The default was the “largest sovereign
debt default in history” (Hornbeck, 2013:1). Unique among Argentina’s debt crises, the
2001 default resulted from a perfect storm precipitated by the failure of a government
policy (neo-liberal reforms1) inherited from a military dictatorship and pushed to the limit
by President Menem. The “convertibility plan” that fixed the peso to the dollar in 1991 (1
peso=1 dollar) imposed rigid constraints on Argentina’s fiscal and monetary policy 2 ,
forcing it to rely on excessive international borrowing, financial liberalization and inflow
of foreign investment and privatization (“oligopoly buy-outs”) (Rozenwurcel and Bleger,
1998; Rock, 2002; O’Connell, 2005)
The 2001 default was also a product of crisis-driven, unsustainable policies aggravated
by the IMF’s problematic lending. That big financial players were determined to bet on
the debt of poor countries with little concern for risk also contributed. By then,
Argentina’s debt service ratio had reached alarming levels and despite last minute
interventions (“mega swaps”, “corralito”) to stay afloat, the government defaulted. Amid
rising political unrest and soon after the resignation of President de la Rua, President
Duhalde abandoned the currency board regime (January 2002) and simultaneously
devalued the peso (Hornbeck, 2013:1-3; Damill et al, 2005:57)
Soon afterwards, Argentina launched a popular recovery based on a successful debt
restructuring aimed at “financial independence” from the IMF. Ignoring warnings about
the dire consequences of a default, Argentina defied the “conventional wisdom” that
successful recovery must be based on a dramatic fiscal restraint (cuts in government
expenditures) and tight monetary policy (high interest rates). Unorthodox measures to
reduce fiscal deficits (higher taxes on soybean exports) were combined with increased
government spending (“pro-poor” policies, job creation), which gained momentum
towards fast recovery (Milberg, 2012). From 2002 to 2012, Argentina grew at an average
rate of 6% (Hallinan, 2014). These developments sparked a debate within economic
theory over the drivers of Argentine recovery —whether it was state-led/demand
followed (Keynesian view) or largely external (due to the global commodity boom and
higher prices for agricultural exports)3.
While the Argentine default in 2001 was expected4, its outcomes (i.e., suspension of debt
payments to foreign creditors and the following debt restructuring) were not. Politically,
the default opened the way to the theory of “new developmentalism”, presented as the
antithesis of neo-liberalism yet within a capitalist framework (Bresser-Pereira, 2012).
Unexpectedly, the new government refused to restructure the debt in terms favorable to
IMF and private bond holders. Unparalleled in history, the Argentine debt restructuring
forced private creditors to accept the largest “haircut” ever, thus belying the notion that a
semi-peripheral state was powerless against global financial capital. Cooper and Momani
(2005) attributed this success to Kirchner’s “skillful diplomacy” of “segmenting the
international creditors” based on their conflicting interests (short-vs. long-term).

The face value of bonds that Argentina owed to private investors was $81.8 billion. In
January 2005, after a series of unsuccessful attempts to placate various multilateral
creditors, President Nestor Kirchner “abandoned negotiations to restructure the debt”
(Hornbeck, 2013:1). He made a unilateral (“take it or leave it”) offer that Argentina
exchange new bonds for the older (defaulted) bonds at a substantially lower value—30
cents on the dollar owed in default (Roos, 2014). Nearly 93% of the creditors accepted
the discount rate of 30%, trading in their defaulted bonds for newly issued Argentina
bonds 5 . In early 2006, Argentina paid the IMF in full ($9.5 billion) from its foreign
reserves, which amounted to $27 billion (Datz, 2009:472). In 2014, it fully met its
obligations to the Paris Club countries, around $6.3 billion (Hornbeck, 2013:3; Hallinan,
2014).
However, the remaining 7% (the so called holdout creditors) rejected the 2005 and 2010
bond exchanges with the majority of creditors. Among these holdouts, Peter Singer, an
owner of Elliot Management, a hedge fund, brought a lawsuit against Argentina
demanding to be paid in full. In 2012, U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Griesa ruled on
behalf of “vulture funds”, claiming that the “country can’t make bond payments until it
compensates hedge funds that refused to accept restructured debt in the years following
Argentina’s 2001 default” (Parks et al, 2014:parag.2). Although Argentina appealed
Judge Griesa’s ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal on June 16,
2014. Since the judge blocked Argentina from paying bondholders without paying hedge
funds as well, the majority of creditors could not receive $539 million due on discount
bonds. Although Argentina did not fail to make the payment, S&P and Fitch Ratings
reduced Argentina’s foreign debt rating to “selective default” on July 30, 2014
(Stevenson, 2014).
Theoretical Argument
The debt crisis literature maintains that a major default forces debtor governments to
sacrifice sovereignty over financial policy for fear of retaliation from powerful creditors
(Hertz, 2004). Although there is no “international bankruptcy court” to compel sovereign
states to pay off debts, states may be denied access to international credit or risk having
their overseas assets confiscated if they fail to restructure debt. Therefore, instead of
defaulting on an entire debt, governments often negotiate with the debt holders (i.e.,
private creditors, governmental agencies, multilateral lending agencies) in exchange for
partial reduction of their debt payments, which is called “debt restructuring”.
Offering a class-based and historically grounded analysis of this phenomenon,
Soederberg (2005) reminds us that the evolution of “transnational debt architecture”
favors the interests of global financial capital--private sector creditors in advanced
capitalist nations-- over debtor states in the South. In examining the Argentine default
(1999-2001), she shows that through market-led and “ad hoc” mechanisms for
restructuring sovereign debts (like Paris and London Clubs, “Collection Action
Clauses”), creditor nations reinforce “bargaining” and “disciplinary” powers over debtor
states. Debt restructuring serves to socialize debt domestically “through increased forms
of economic exploitation (lower wages, longer hours), higher taxes”, “higher interest

rates” and “cuts in government spending in terms of education, health and welfare”
(Soederberg, 2005:933).
Soederberg also contrasts two mechanisms for restructuring Argentine debt (2001-2003)
owed to international private creditors during the period 2001-2013: The IMF’s SDRM
approach (“Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism”) and the US Treasury’s CAC
proposal (“Collection Action Clause”). She argues that while the first was more likely to
serve the interests of debtor states, the second favored powerful financial interests
(securities and bond industry associations) and their creditor state representatives, such as
US Treasury Undersecretary John Taylor. The IMF approach was similar to Chapter 11
of US Bankruptcy law, one which allowed debtor states to buy time by calling a break on
debt payments and reorganize debt in a timely manner. Serving as a “market-based
approach” to debt management, the one pursued by the CAC contained a “super-majority
of creditors” clause allowing foreign creditors (bondholders) “to approve a process that is
believed to make it easier to restructure debt by allowing a majority of creditors to
impose a deal” (Soederberg, 2005:945). Officially accepted during the 2003 Annual
meetings of the IMF and the World Bank, the CAC made it easier for private creditors to
obtain the best offer from debtor states and in a shorter time.
Helleiner (2006) presents a slightly different reading of debt restructuring initiatives
during the period 1970-2003. He identifies “collective action problems” in the
construction of a formal “Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism” (SDRM) and
indicates that not only private creditors but also some of the debtor states were opposed
to the formation of SDRM. Indeed, as Miller and Thomas showed (2006:2), a “coalition
of creditors, debtors and the US government” vetoed the IMF plan (SDRM), leading the
way for the formation of CAC in 2003. Particularly, the main challenges to a satisfactory
agreement on sovereign debt resolution and its afterwards stemmed from 1) “collective
action problem involving sovereign debtors and private foreign creditors”, 2) “basic
distributional conflicts embodied in any restructuring effort”, and 3) “uncertain behavior
of private creditors’ states” (Helleiner, 2006:2).
The conflicts of interests were not exclusively reflected in formal debt negotiations
involving the SDRM. The swap agreement that Argentina negotiated in 2005 was
technically similar to a CAC deal—one based on the “inclusion of Collection Action
Clause in sovereign bond contracts” (Miller and Thomas, 2006:2).
The case study presented in this paper (the “Griesa ruling”) demonstrates how
contentious Argentina’s relationship has become with a minority of holdout creditors.
The current claims of “vulture funds” are based on the “judicial enforcement of sovereign
obligations (throughout holdout litigation)”6. Clearly, this enforcement protects creditor
rights in particular, and global financial interests in general. There is also a contradiction
in the claims that go against the “Argentine debt swap” negotiated between the majority
of creditors and Argentine government in 2003-2005. While much resembling CAC than
SDRM, the swap agreement involved a favorable haircut on Argentine debt that “was
neither mediated by the IMF nor assisted by clauses to promote creditor coordination: It

was take-it-or-leave it offer from the debtor, accepted by a supermajority of holders”
(Miller and Thomas, 2006:6).
The rest of the paper examines the evolution of Argentine debt swap since 2005. It puts
the conflicts embodied in the “holdout litigation” in historical perspective and argues that
“vulture funds” claims would supersede the swap exchange negotiated in the first place.
As Argentina refuses to pay “vulture funds”, financial interests (majority of bond holders
still waiting to be paid) are also divided over whether the nonparticipating holdouts
should be paid. We further claim that the international financial system has changed since
the successful resolution of the Argentine debt. Confirming Rasmus (2014), the slow
growth in capitalist centers (tied to Fed’s less easier monetary policy recently) and a shift
of the center of the global recession to the semi-periphery has triggered a Latin American
slowdown. This means that Argentina can no longer rely on a favorable external
environment (“commodity boom”) to trigger a Keynesian (demand)-led recovery.
The U.S. position on holdout creditors (the Supreme Court decision backing the hedge
fund deal against Argentina) is patently interventionist and a repudiation of Kirchner’s
2005 demands. However, although the U.S. is integral to the reproduction of
“transnational debt architecture” that disguises and reinforces the “power global financial
capitals over debtor states” (Soederberg, 2014:928), the financial interests of sovereign
states, private creditors and debtor states are divided over the resolution of holdout
payments. At a micro-level of analysis, the conflicts among different fractions of capital
might prevent a hedge fund victory as Argentina may not be easily convinced into
accepting the conditions of “Griesa ruling”. Hypothetically, the risk of losing an
emerging debt market for the gain of few “vulture funds” may be too great for large
banks from creditor nations (U.S., European Union). Selective payments to holdouts can
lead to “moral hazard” when just a few bondholders benefit from sovereign default.
Argentina’s post-crisis indicators (higher inflation, devalued peso, rising unemployment,
and worsening trade balance) and social unrest testify to its dependence on foreign capital
and adaptation to neo-classical orthodoxy at home. Although the outcome of the gridlock
with holdout creditors is too soon to predict, Argentina is facing yet another crisis
flowing from its integration into the global debt structure.
“Vulture Funds” and the Emerging Market Debt
While “vulture funds” are just a microcosm of existing power relationships in debt
restructuring, they pose unique challenges to sovereign bond contracts and global
financial architecture. Basically, they are opportunists with even more speculative
tendencies than the average private capital firm or hedge fund. Sabat describes them as a
“particular type of holdout creditor who through the secondary market buy distressed
assets at a discount and then refuse to participate in sovereign debt restructurings”
(Sabat, 2013:1). They differ from other holdout creditors by aggressive litigation against
the defaulting country “for the full face value of the debt”. Most often, “vulture funds”
buy distressed government bonds from poor countries at fire sale prices, gambling on the
possibility that through litigation the courts will award them the full price no matter the

consequence to the debtor nation or more conventional debt holders (Ghosh and
Vernengo, 2012).
“Vulture funds” have successfully won litigation against Congo, Peru and Liberia, and
most recently the government of Argentina (Wilkie and Grim, 2013). They are willing to
fight for their own narrow gains (highest return on investment) at the expense of global
finance’s overall health and stability—especially sovereign debtors and other creditors.
As a result, several commentators criticized vulture funds and “proposed mechanisms” to
regulate their powers—especially the use of aggressive campaigns against defaulting
governments, and the enforcing of “contractual claims against sovereign debtors through
litigation” (Fish and Gentile, 2004:1043).
On the other hand, “vulture funds” are not simply an expression of aggressive lobbying
on the part of financial institutions. It is part and parcel of the restructuring of the global
financial order that has occurred since the resurgence of financial crisis in Latin America,
Russia and Asia in the late 1990s. In the process, “vulture funds” became both the
transmission belt of contagion as well as its agent in restructuring sovereign debts.
Rethel (2012) maintains that the mechanisms of “sovereign debt restructuring” have
changed since the 1980s. The most important change has been the “disintermediation” of
capital flows assisted by new instruments of debt financing in emerging market
economies—increasingly away from official borrowing (commercial bank loans, IMF
loans and governmental loans) towards domestic bond issuance and portfolio investment
flows. Rethel calls this process a “domesticisation of emerging market debt”, which
include securitized (government) debt issued in local currency (such as Treasury
securities, bonds and stocks) and held by a wide range of domestic investors: the central
bank, commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions such as hedge funds, mutual
funds, pension funds and insurance companies (Bue et al, 2014:16). As a result, domestic
debt accounted for a larger portion of total government debt in some of the low and
middle-income countries. When debt was issued domestically, it served a number of
purposes: 1) to gain “greater jurisdictional control over the debt issued by domestic
economic actors, both sovereign and corporate”, 2) to “reduce the role of the dollar” and
exposure of the issuer to currency risk by denominating debt in local currency, 3) to lead
the way for development of national financial systems (especially “local currency bond
markets”), 4) to restructure/recapitalize banking systems and refinance national debt in
the wake of the Asian financial crisis (Rethel, 2012:130).
Since the early 1990s, domestic bond markets have become a major platform for debt
financing in developing countries even while destabilizing them. As such it explains why
Latin America is caught in a debt trap and why reliance on local bond markets may not
necessarily resolve the debt crisis. Some disadvantages include short-term maturity of
domestic debt, which increases exposure to “rollover” and “interest rate risks”. In
developing countries, in addition to weakly regulated financial systems, the main
challenges include “supply-side” constraints on the issuance of long-term debt at a
“reasonable cost” (Bua et al, 2014:1).

Figure 1. Evolution of Argentine Public Debt
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With respect to Argentina, the sovereign debt structure highlights “financialization” of
debt markets and the nation’s peripheral integration into the global economy. Figure 1
indicates the rising importance of domestic public debt during the period 2003-2012
within the total debt of Argentina. Overall, domestic debt has a higher proportion to total
debt compared to external debt. In 2012, domestic public debt was 62.78% of total public
debt whereas external debt was 32.4%. The exact composition of debt portfolio in terms
of instruments, investor base and maturity structure cannot be ascertained with surety.
For example, the data does not distinguish between different types of investors—i.e.,
percentage of debt held by commercial banks, the central bank, non-bank and other
financial institutions (hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds). A decisive trend is that
Argentina has increased its borrowing in local government debt since 2003; there has
been a growing importance of domestically issued debt, indicating the expanded role of
capital markets for raising funds subsequently with the default in 2002. This trend in the
structure of debt financing falls under the category broadly described as
“financialization”-- the “increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial
actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international
economies” (Epstein, 2005:3)
Debt restructuring in the post-default period indicates the formation of public policy on
behalf of decisive capitalist sectors7. The financial sector (especially commercial banks)
seems to be the most concentrated investor base that benefited from sovereign debt
restructuring. For example, the pesification of all dollar debts indicates how industrial
recovery would not be possible without compensating bank losses. Dominant
socioeconomic groups, such as agricultural producers and domestic industries, were
indebted in dollars; they were anxious about not being able to pay back their debt in the
event of devaluation. Therefore, they saw pesification as a mechanism to reduce their
debt burden. Banks, while strongly preferring dollarization to devaluation, accepted
pesification (as an “emergency measure”) to avoid massive bankruptcies or defaults on
loan repayments (Calvo, 2008:18).

“Asymmetric pesification” reflected the emerging consensus between the financial elite
and the Argentine state at the time. Pesification was asymmetric to the extent that it
treated corporate debt and private deposits differently. The corporate debts were
converted at the rate of 1 peso 1 dollar while all foreign currency bank deposits were
rated at 1.4 pesos per dollar. Mounting a lobbying campaign, banks sought to be
compensated for the costs of “asymmetrical” conversion of dollars to pesos. While the
government attempted to tax oil exports to provide the funds for this purpose, lobbying
pressures from petroleum companies preempted such a measure. As Calvo argued, “the
power struggle took place and eventually led to a policy outcome that favored the most
concentrated sectors of economic power” (Calvo, 2008:34). To absorb bank losses from
“asymmetric pesification”, the Argentine government issued $5.9 billion new debt and
also “established different inflation adjusting mechanisms of deposits and pesoified
credits” (Damill et al, 2005:66).
The Holdout Problem and the “Griesa Ruling”
The resolution of Argentine debt crisis highlights the dominance of financial capital over
the rest of the economy. It also explains the dilemma facing the Argentine government—
to address systemic stability towards economic recovery, the state had to placate the
demands of powerful financial sectors. Imposing austerity and financing bank losses
(“asymmetric pesification”) at the expense of ordinary citizens set a precedent favorable
for debt restructuring in 2005 and 2010.
Argentina initiated bond exchanges in two stages. In January 2005, out of $81.8 billion
debt owed to bond holders, it exchanged $62.3 billion of defaulted bonds for $35.2
billion in new bonds. The amount of debt owed to private investors in 2010 remained
around $29 billion (bond principal plus interest). With the bond exchange concluded on
December 31, 2010, the total participation rate increased to 91.3% of defaulted debt,
which also included the 2005 participants. From 2010 to 2011, Argentina reduced the
portion of debt owed to holdouts and the Paris Club of nations from 10% of total public
sector debt to 7% of total public debt. From 2002 to 2010, international reserves also
increased from $10.4 billion to $52.2 billion. During the period 2003-2008, the Argentine
economy experienced an average growth rate of 8.5% and a primary surplus of 2.8% in
revenues, enabling the government to refinance external debt at a faster pace than during
2001 or 2005 (Hornbeck, 2013:5-7).
Increased revenues and foreign reserves were not the only sources of debt financing.
During restructuring, Argentina addressed the ongoing crisis by adopting austerity
measures aimed at socializing the financial risks. In 2001, they included an attempt by the
government to push for “zero deficits law” and fiscal tightening. Imposing a dramatic cut
in public employee wages, the law also required pension cutbacks. These draconian
measures led to the emergence of a “piquetero movement”, which organized employed
and unemployed workers towards large-scale mobilization against austerity measures
(Kabat, 2014:378).
Yet imposing austerity was not sufficient to address the ongoing crisis. With almost no

access to multilateral loans or external financing in capital markets, Argentina adopted
the strategy of “monetizing debt” (Hornbeck, 2013:6). This involved refinancing or
paying off debt by issuing government bonds and selling them to the central bank,
domestic commercial banks, public or private investors and other governments (Mishkin,
2005). The “government debt market” became a major platform for financing deficits in
other economies as well, such as Brazil, Turkey and Lebanon (Hardie, 2012).
With no real alternatives, Argentina negotiated the debt under duress. With its status as a
semi-peripheral economy, Argentina came to capital markets at a disadvantage and thus
was subject to the onerous conditions that would create a new round of instability. During
these bond exchanges, new bonds were issued in order to raise money for repaying bonds
coming due. The bonds benefited domestic and foreign investors who participated in the
restructuring process, as well as Argentina in its role as recipient of portfolio capital
flows. Datz showed that the bonds exchanged in the 2005 debt swap “registered returns
of 25% and 50% respectively” and there were even considerable returns in “extremely
risky bonds” (“junk bonds”) (Datz, 2009:475). After 2005, Argentina issued “Bonar”
bonds under local laws, mainly purchased by big banks of core advanced countries (such
as Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup) in “secondary markets” and paid three
times higher than the government’s offer (8% interest rate) (Datz, 2009:473).
Furthermore, based on the bond swaps exchanged after 2005, Argentina “fulfilled its
obligations” to the majority creditors (above 90%) who agreed to the debt restructuring.
Few days prior to July 30, 2014, Argentina made semiannual payments on the
restructured bonds by depositing $539 million into the Bank of New York Mellon.
However, U.S. Federal judge Thomas Griesa did not allow the bank to transfer the
payment to Argentina’s creditors. He had earlier “ordered that Argentina could not pay
the creditors who had accepted its restructuring until it fully paid—including past
interest—those who had rejected it” (Stiglitz and Guzman, 2014:parag.2).
Debt negotiations made Argentina vulnerable to an attack by a minority of holdout
creditors. First, the Argentine bonds were issued under New York law, meaning that
Argentina had to pay its creditors from New York. Although Argentina could technically
bypass the New York Court and transfer the jurisdiction of bond issuance and thus pay
the exchange bondholders from Argentina, it did not have the complete list of
bondholders, which was kept by a foreign financial firm. Neither the banks nor the
foreign firms wanted to be perceived in “contempt” of a U.S. judge’s order (Eavis and
Stevenson, 2014a).
In this round of debt negotiations, the complex set of arrangements between foreign
bondholders and their governments put Argentina at a disadvantage. For example, many
of the bondholders are “bound” by their own government rules “restricting them from
holding assets under foreign jurisdiction” (The Economist, 2014:parag.7). Even if the
majority of private creditors agree to the “rerouting” of bonds to Argentina to avoid
paying “vulture funds”, Argentina still needs a financial intermediary outside of New
York law. Finally “Argentina would need to convince Bank of New York Mellon, its
current trustee, to release information about the bondholders to its new intermediary”,

which has already declared, it “will comply with any court order by which is it deemed
bound” (The Economist, 2014:parag7).
In addition, paying out “vulture funds” increases the burden on Argentina because of the
“RUFO clause”8 stated in Argentina’s bond prospectus. Buying Argentine bonds for a
mere $48 million in 2008, Griesa’s ruling would reward Singer’s NML capital
handsomely-- $832 million (“a return of 1,600%”). Under the same ruling, NML capital
and other “vulture funds” (1% of the creditors) would also obtain $1.5 billion. If the
additional claims of other holdouts (6.6% of total creditors) were considered, the debt
owed would amount to $15 billion (Stiglitz and Guzman, 2014)—nearly half of
Argentina’s total dollar reserves.
If Argentina pays off a minority of hedge funds before December 31, 2104, however, the
“RUFO Clause” in the bond contract would kick in, thus allowing all bondholders to
demand the “same treatment” as holdouts. This was reinstated with the aim of equal
treatment for all creditors, i.e., “vulture funds” cannot be treated better than the majority
of bondholders who accepted the debt restructuring (Lopez, 2014). Therefore if the clause
takes effect, this might increase Argentina’s obligations to $200 billion (Eavis and
Stevenson, 2014a), a draconian penalty that would generate serious repercussions for the
Argentine economy.
Within financial capital there is no consensus on how their interests can best be achieved
but “vulture funds” continue the legal battle with Argentina aggressively. While the main
group of bondholders are willing to exchange their bonds for new bonds, “vulture funds”
refuse to “tender” the defaulted bonds and thus have received no payment. Instead, they
demand full payment to litigant holdouts and increasingly put pressure on Argentina to
obey the U.S. court ruling.
To press their demand for full payment, “vulture funds” formed a website called Fact
Check Argentina, where they respond to the argument that Argentina was “forced” to
default by a court ruling. The website is filled with claims that Argentina can indeed
afford to pay the holdouts and chose not to do so, disrespecting the judge’s decision. It
also publishes articles on the “costs” of not paying, floating a doomsday scenario in the
likely event of default that includes a collapse of investments, capital flight, and ordinary
people in Argentina suffering. Interestingly, by July 30th markets did not react as
“vulture funds” predicted, “distinguishing” between, as Stiglitz and Guzman (2014)
noted, a real default and Griesa’s order. The interest rates on various types of Argentine
corporate loans were stable and the borrowing costs were “lower than the average for the
whole year” (parag.10).
The Risks Posed to Developing Economies
Since the U.S. court ruling on behalf of “vulture funds”, the mainstream media’s response
towards Argentina has been mixed. In liberal media like Huffington Post and Project
Syndicate, several authors criticized Judge Griesa for encouraging speculative behavior
and moral hazard among investors. They exposed the political connections between Peter

Singer’s NML capital (a subsidiary of Elliot Management), American Task Force
Argentina (“the group advocating the full payments on the bonds”) and the Clinton
administration (Wilkie and Grim, 2013). In Project Syndicate, Stiglitz and Guzman
(2014) refused to call it a “default”, noting that Argentina “was willing and able to pay its
creditors, but was blocked by a judge from doing so”. They further noted that: “Griesa’s
ruling, however, encourages usurious behavior, threatens the functioning of international
financial markets and defies a basic tenet of modern capitalism: insolvent debtors need a
fresh start” (Stiglitz and Guzman, 2014: parag.2). New York Times did not take an
editorial position on the issue, rather describing events as they unfolded. The Economist,
a vocal opponent of the Kirchners’ policies, reported on Argentina’s $48 billion reserves
at the BIS and the Elliot fund’s unsuccessful attempt at seizing them (The Economist,
2011).
While Argentina has fully paid its debt to a supermajority of bondholders, it objected to
settling with “vulture funds” who did not participate in the bond exchanges. Axel
Kiciloff, the Finance Minister of Argentina, described the “negotiations as extortion”,
stressing that “We are not going to sign any deal which compromises the future of
Argentines” (Eavis and Stevenson, 2014b:parag.6). On July 17, 2014, Argentina placed
an advertisement in New York Times objecting to the notion that Argentina defaulted and
added: “Default means not paying, Argentina does pay”. Based on an article that
appeared on the AFTA (American Task Force) website, Argentina characterized the
demands of “vulture funds” as “overburdening” the country with debt “in order to make
exorbitant profits” such as gaining strategic control over other countries’ natural
resources. The fact that AFTA links the payments to the U.S company Chevron, which
may leave Argentina if it does not pay “vulture funds”, may be a sign of their “ulterior
motives” (New York Times, 2014). Although gauging the power of secretive hedge funds
is problematic, they are undoubtedly a menacing force that exploited poor countries in the
past.
It is unclear how far U.S. pressure on hedge funds to extract larger gains will go. The
final U.S. resolution on this issue is still to be determined. Argentina has recently paid the
Paris Club of Nations in full, including the $500 million it owed to the U.S. government.
Up till now, with laws prohibiting U.S. government agencies from lending to non-paying
countries, the U.S. vetoed loans to Argentina at the Inter-American Development Bank
and World Bank. Some members of Congress, allied with American Task Force
Argentina, a “private lobby group” for hedge funds and holdout creditors, threatened
Argentina with legislation such as the “Judgment Evading Foreign States Accountability
Act of 2011”. This bill, however, failed to attract a hearing in the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs on November 29, 2012, having not much impact abroad. It was suggested
that: “the committee lacked jurisdiction” and “there were larger foreign policy issues to
consider” (Hornbeck, 2012:12).
The outcome of this case is ultimately dependent on negotiations between the Argentine
state and various fractions of capital at both the domestic and international levels.
Repayment on the terms dictated by Griesa would ruin Argentina’s economy, especially

if the “RUFO clause” triggers. This would lead to the depletion of Argentina’s foreign
reserves. It is estimated that such a payment would cost every Argentine more than
$3500—“more than one-third of average per capita income” (Stiglitz and Guzman,
2014:parag.8). According to Roos (2014), the full payment to “vulture funds” (the
“alternative” of default), would “also be particularly costly for the domestic elite, which
is usually invested in government bonds and which derives much greater economic
advantage from deep integration into global financial markets” (Roos, 2014: parag.8).
The conflicts of interests among different groups complicate the resolution of holdout
claims. Holders of Argentine debt include American as well as European investors.
Consequently states are inclined to protect their own economic interests. From the
standpoint of investors, if Argentina settles with NML capital, it has to negotiate with the
majority of bondholders to “waive” the “RUFO clause” merely to pay off “vulture funds”
(Lopez, 2014). In that case, paying a minority of creditors leads to “moral hazard”
because one groups gets a better deal than others. In 2013, a German court ruled in favor
of Argentina, rejecting the “first petition from the holders of defaulted Argentine bonds”.
Similarly, a Belgian court refused to cash in NML’s defaulted bonds and ordered “the
lifting of the embargo on Argentine diplomatic bank accounts” demanded by NML
(Buenos Aires Herald, 2013).
Generally, European and Latin American countries, especially France, Mexico and
Brazil, supported Argentina during the Supreme Court’s review of the rival claims. With
the exception of the U.S., Canada and Panama, Argentina has had the full backing of the
“Organization of the American States”. As the judge’s order unfolded, the IMF sought to
“intervene” on behalf of Argentina but the U.S. pressured it not do so (Quiggin,
2014:parag.14).
While the official U.S. position on this has not been clear, the interests of bigger capital
may override the demands of a few hedge funds. Recently, the Obama administration has
been concerned that New York may lose business to London if Argentina defaults as well
as destabilizing financial markets (Rathbone et al, 2014).
Whether long or short-term American interests prevail in Argentina depends on the
lobbying power of the financial sector, which is difficult to ascertain at this stage. The
more fundamental issue is whether the “mutual” interests of states to regulate finance can
transcend the narrow interests of their financial sectors.
Symptoms of Financial Instability
The “Griesa ruling” is just a microcosm of the financial power structure confronting
Argentina. A default on holdout payments has the potential of destabilizing Argentina’s
economy as well as diverting funds from the public sector, infrastructure, health and
education. However, to see “vulture funds” as the root cause of instability overlooks
Argentina’s deeper integration into the global financial system. Argentina has not
escaped the cycle of instability despite successfully restructuring debt since 2005.

Argentina
na is currently facing what some economists have called the “shift of the global
economic crisis to emerging markets” (Rasmus, 2014). In describing
ibing the ongoing crisis as
a “new type of debt-deflation”,
deflation”, Guillen (2011:187) identified “the limits of financefinance
dominated regime of accumulation characterized by securitization”. In Soederberg’s
terms, the securitization of transnational debt has involved the emergence of a less
regulated global financial order. It has in particular involved the emergence of neoneo
liberal, “exploitative strategies of accumulation” in debtor states in order to overcome the
“crisis of over-accumulation”.
accumulation”. Since the mid-1980s, such strategies have been
characterized by a trend away from “less volatile bank loans” towards foreign portfolio
capital and the arrival of new actors and institutions on international lending scene, such
as hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds. As a result, sovereign debt became more
unstable and complicated (Soederberg, 2005:937
2005:937-938).
While Argentina’s post-crisis
crisis model, one tied to Keynesian stimuli and export taxation,
tried to break with “financialization” to promote industrial production (Figure 2) and
regulate speculative capital flows, it still rests on financial “indebtedness”. In developing
countries such finance-centered
centered development is unsustainable because it generates “pro“pro
cyclical borrowing” through government debt creation. In developing countries,
government borrowing relies on access to capital markets during recessions and as such
is susceptible to short-term
term capital flights (Panizza et al, 2009:666) that periodically
wrack Latin America.
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Argentina’s improved relations with the U.S. cannot be reduced to big power domination
of a weaker nation, in effect making Argentina “cry uncle” as was the case with
Nicaragua in the 1980s. Indeed, the failure of Keynesian responses to the sub-prime
sub
mortgage
age crisis (monetary stimuli and liquidity injections into U.S. banks) has kept neoneo
classical economics alive. As Rasmus (2014) explained, it has propelled the shift of
financial crisis from the U.S. to “emerging markets”. Since mid
mid-2013,
2013, the “dual
character”
er” of global recession has manifested itself through a reversal of “V shape”
s
recovery.. Once rapidly growing BRICS/commodity exporters (China, India, Brazil,
South Africa, Russia) have slowed down while capitalist centers like the U.S., Europe
and Japan aree now stabilizing or growing at lower rates (instead of “stagnating”). The
Th

slow growth in BRICS is also related to the Fed’s announcement that it would restrict
liquidity injections into banks and “consider raising interest rates” during summer 2013
(Rasmus, 2014:parag.22).
The recurrent instability undermines Argentina’s ability to service debt (even in terms
favorable to domestic elite). Argentina has become the weakest link in the regional
economy during this new “deflationary” cycle. The crisis has reached Latin America
through limited access to capital markets, depreciating currencies, declining trade and
investment flows, capital flight and higher cost of accessing external funds. Unlike the
Mexican and Brazilian economies, which have not experienced significant increases in
capital outflows from 2007 to 2008, Argentina (along with Colombia) changed from
“being net recipients of non-FDI financial flows to net exporters of financial resources”
(Titelman et al, 2009:22).
Despite President Kirchner’s radical rhetoric against “vulture funds”, Argentina has
adapted to the “Washington Consensus” lately. It has pursued more orthodox policies
such as repaying the Paris Club of nations and paying off the Spanish oil company
Repsol ($6.5 billion). Meanwhile, unemployment is rising against declining industrial
production (Figure 2) and plummeting capital inflows and international reserves. A rapid
devaluation of the peso in January 2014 and the resulting inflation (nearly 23%) also led
to currency controls and some tightening of monetary policy (ECLAC, 2014).
Summary and Conclusions
This paper examined how Argentina has negotiated debt since 2005 and some of the
challenges remaining for the payment of holdout creditors—the so called “vulture funds”.
Putting the conflicts embodied in the “holdout litigation” in historical perspective, we
argued that “vulture funds” claims would supersede the swap exchange negotiated in the
first place. As Argentina refuses to pay “vulture funds”, financial capital interests
(majority of bond holders still waiting to be paid) are also divided over whether the
nonparticipating holdouts should be paid.
Overall, the outcome of the deadlock with holdout creditors is uncertain. The clashing
interests among creditor-debtor states and financial capital might prevent a hedge fund
victory. Hypothetically, the risk of losing a debt market for the gain of few investors may
be too great for larger banks. Full repayment to holdouts can lead to “moral hazard”
when just a few bondholders benefit from default.
Argentina’s post-crisis model was tied to Keynesian stimuli that elevated the role of the
state over financial capital and encouraged industrial production. But the institutional and
structural foundations of financial “indebtedness” remain in place. Such finance-centered
development is not sustainable because it generates “pro-cyclical borrowing” through the
sovereign bond market. In developing countries, government borrowing relies on access
to capital markets during recessions and as such is susceptible to short-term capital flights
(Panizza et al, 2009:666) that periodically wrack Latin America.

The “Griesa ruling” is just a microcosm of the transnational debt structure confronting
Argentina. Given the end of “V-shape” recovery underway in emerging markets,
Argentina needs to look for domestic sources of financing that rely on productive capital
as engine of growth rather than financial such as external sector and sovereign bond
market only. Resorting to the debt market perpetuates a cycle of instability that deepens
Argentina’s peripheral integration into the global economy.
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According to Soederberg (2005), in spite of the differences (timing and application) among developing
countries, neo-liberal reforms facilitated a transition from Keynesian economic policies (such as trade and
capital controls) to a “market-led restructuring” where loans from creditor states and international financial
institutions were attached to “Structural Adjustment Programs” in debtor states. This required them to
engage in “fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditures priorities, tax reform, liberalization of interest
rates, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation and property rights”
(Soederberg, 2005:938).
2
From 2000 to 2002, Argentina’s total public debt increased from 45.7% of GDP to 166.3% of GDP
(Hornbeck, 2013:3).The “convertibility plan” was based on the orthodox principles of fiscal and monetary
discipline, which imposed strict conditions on the Argentina’s ability to manage a financial crisis. It
stipulated that Central Bank support the “monetary base” exclusively with “foreign exchange reserves”
rather than printed money (Rozenwurcel and Bleger, 1998:369). Thus, the plan relied on limiting the
printing of currency to cover deficits, 2) prohibiting the devaluation of peso to increase exports and 3)
using fiscal discipline (cuts in public expenditures) to counteract business cycles. This left the government
with “no room” to address the recession following the 1997-1998 East Asian, Russian/LTCM crisis. With
no option for a fiscal stimulus, Argentina relied on excessive international borrowing and fiscal discipline
(cuts in public expenditures) to finance the deficit, which reinforced the recessionary cycle. The
“convertibility plan” was was a “straight jacket” for Argentina; fiscal deficits “were not restrained at either
the provincial or national levels to thresholds required to support the convertibility plan. By 1993, debt
began to grow, compounded by the practice of rolling it over. From 1995 to the end of 2001, the debt
service ratio grew from 30% to 66%” (Hornbeck, 2013:2).
3
On the role of state and macroeconomic policies in “demand-led recovery”, see Cohen (2011), Weisbrot
(2012), Weisbrot et al (2011), Frenkel and Rapetti (2008), Gruel and Riggirozzi (2007), among others. For
the opposite view emphasizing the importance of external demand and Latin America’s integration into
global capitalism via “agro-export model”, see Caldentey and Vernengo (2010).
4
For an analysis of detailed negotiations with the IMF, domestic and international creditors, especially the
“mega swaps” exchanged with bond holders in June and November 2001, prior to the default in December
2001, see Datz (2009:466-468), Damill et al (2005:56), Hornbeck (2013).
5
The exchange offer was made in two stages. In 2005, Argentina restructured $62.3 billion of the $81.8
billion in principle—around 76% of the total debt in default. The debt exchange was re-opened in 2010,
obtaining another $12.4 billion of defaulted bonds and thus raising the amount of debt restructured to a
91.3% of original debt (Hornbeck, 2013:1).
6
As explained in Miller and Thomas’ review of literature on this topic (Miller and Thomas, 2006:3).
7
For in-depth analysis of economic, social and political transformations in Argentina during the 1990s and
post-convertibility, see Azpiazu and Schorr (2010), Azpiazu and Nochteff (1998), Basualdo (2000; 2001).
8
“Rights Upon Future Offers” clause.
1

